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POLICY STATEMENT OF TRANSAFRICA 
December 1981 
Introduction 
TransAfrica; the Afro-American lobby for Africa and the Caribbean, seeks to 
fashion a more enlightened U.S. policy toward the aforementioned regions. The 
U.S. policies to date, couched wholly in terms of East-West geostrategic rivalry, 
have served to exacerbate economic, social, and military tensions in the world, 
the very opposite of what was proclaimed to be the original intent. 
Caribbean and African peoples basically have been denied the opportunity to harbor 
legitimate aspirations for a better life and to follow what they perceive to be 
the best means of achieving their ends especially if the means . differs from Western 
sanctioned ones. Thus, struggles for political and economic independence are often 
casted as "communist instigated" and dangerous. The typical U.S. response has been 
to reflexively side the presiding authoritarian elite or engage in economic sub-
version. 
Over the years U.S. foreign aid not only has been meager but closely tied to the 
purchase of cost ineffective U.S. goods and the . adoption of pro-western policies 
on the part of the recipient country . Moreover, instead of fostering economic 
development in the most needy countries, the bulk of aid has flowed to a select 
few: Israel, Eygpt, the Phillipines, and Pakistan. Other countries with "lesser 
strategic 11 value receive negligible amounts meant to assuage criticism more than 
to stimulate development. Behind the rhetoric, the U . .S., and for that matter 
the other Western countries, seem very committed to keeping the Third World 
divided and weak. 
TransAfrica argues that the U.S. should strive to increase genuine understanding 
and cooperation between nations and to address such significant global issues 
as poverty, resource use, technology transfers, and international trade and monetary 
reform. Most instability in our view stems from poverty and injustice. U.S. long-
term interests including Soviet containment would be best served by thoughtful, 
consistent, and humane policies. Arms races and the naked exercise of power only 
heighten the possibility of war, polarize relations, and divert precious resources 
from pressing social and.economic problems . 
The following are brief analys es and positions of TransAfrica on a variety of issues . 
POLICY STATEMENT OF TRANSAFRICA 
SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa is distinctive in the world community due to its repression 
of segments of its population on the basis on race. Twenty-two million 
Africans, 3,000,000 "Coloreds" and 800,000 Asians are systematically 
denied basic civil liberties such as the freedom of movement, speech, 
press, assembly, and voting rights as well as equal economic .opportunity. 
As a result . of these inequities, the 4.4 million whites enjoy a living 
standard rivaled by few elites in other countries . 
Since western investments and technology transfers (by far the largest 
dollar value on the African continent) buttress and dynamize the South 
African economy, it is TransAfrica's position that economic sanctions 
in conjunction with diplomatic pressure should be used in order to hasten 
the dismantlement of apartheid. Policies of "gentle persuasion" historically 
have proven effete. The South African minority has vacillated. between 
cosmetic reform and bold resurgence of white supremacy ·. While expensive 
five star hotels and a few entertainment/spo~ting events have been integrated, 
political repression is widespread and the central features of apartheid 
remain. 
The United States and for that matter the other western powers have to 
recognize the legitimate right to self determination and take forceful 
steps before the country is consumed in a violent conflagration. The 
West cannot ignore the inevitability of Black rule and therefore the 
West should do more to facilitate the transition of power rather than 
to forestall it. 
The Reagan Adminis tration, unfortunately suffers from a serious pox -
rabid anti-communism. Reagan policymakers perceive external conununist 
threats in the region as being more important when in fact the internal 
conditi6ns - the persistence of apartheid and the acquiescence of the 
West in apartheid practices -- proffer the Soviets an angle of attack 
and serves to radicalize the Africans. To compound the problem, the 
United States is promising a military alliance and normalization of 
relations with the Pretoria Regime since South Africa is vehemently 
anti-communist. TQis confusion between cause and effect and foreign 
policy instruments and objectives is not only regrettable but dangerous . 
. Many believe the anti-communism rhetoric is nothing but a rationalization · 
for pure economic greed and an affinity with the white settler culture. 
By portraying African nationalistic movements as Soviet-controllid puppets 
negates past experience and perpetuates the myth that non-European leaders 
and peoples canno t think and act independently. Robert Mugabe, while 
a guerilla was casted as a Soviet lackey yet in power has proven to 
be moderate and shrewd . Similarly, the leadership in Somalia, Eygpt, 
and Sudan have expelled large corps of Soviet technicians and troops, 
showing their independence. 
U.S./South Africa policy should strive for social justice and long-
term stability. The U.S. stands to alienate not only Black South Africans 
who will one day control the country but the rest of mineral rich Black 
Africa by wavering on the one issue that unifies all independent nations 
on the African continent. 
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NAMIBIA 
Namibia or South West Africa has been · under the domination of South 
Africa since 1918 by virtue of a League of Nations mandate . After World 
War II, the United Nations revoked the mandate and in 1968 ruled that 
South Africa illegally occupied the territory. Four years later the 
International Court of Justice recommended withdrawal . At each step 
South Africa balked. During this time the same system of racial discrimi-
nation practiced in South Africa was also introduced in Namibia. Western 
business concerns especially uranium mining companies came to play a 
significant role in the economy. 
In 1965 the South West Africa Peoples Organization (SWAPO) launched 
a guerilla campaign to dislodge the white South Africans under the leadership 
of Sam Nujoma. The ,fighting con,tinue:, today mostly in the northern 
part of the aountry from SWAPO bases in neighboring Angola . 
In a calculated strategy to intimidate SWAPO's host, the Angolan people, 
South Africa continues to support an anti-government insurgency force, 
UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi, and conducts a number of raids against 
·civilian as well as SWAPO targets. 
In 1978 the General Assembly at the United Nations adopted Resolution 435 
calling for free elections and an orderly U.N . supervised transfer of 
power to the black majority. Five Western nations (France, Britain, 
Canada, West Germany, and the United States) were to persuade South 
Africa to agree while the African frontline countries were charged with 
winning the approval of SWAPO. SWAPO readily agreed and has even accepted 
a long list of concessions yet the peace remains elusive . 
At the present time a set of constitutional principles have been tentatively 
accepted bY the African nations but South Africa remains noncommittal. 
The Reagan Administration has struck a deal with the South Africans, 
namely if the South Africans implement an internationally acceptable 
settlement the U.S. will endeavor to remove that country's pariah s.tigma 
and usher it into the Western military alliance. 
TransAfrica advocates a confrontational approach in dealing with South 
Africa . The racist regime in insincere by all indications and will 
only exploit the naivete of the U.S. attempting to portray itself as 
a nation beleaguered by communism. The ultimate fear is that the U.S . . 
will mortgage itself to South Africa, making it a client state and surrogate 
defender of Western economic investments in the region. 
TransAfrica strongly opposes all such measures. United Nations resolution 435 
is an acceptable framework and pressure should be brought to bear on 
South Africa to accept it. 
3 
Western Sahara/Morocco 
I .n 1975 Spain agreed to transfer control of the Western Sahara, a desert _territory · of 
154,000 square miles, to two adjoining nation-states, Morocco and Mauritania . 
in exchange for financial compensation and access to the rich phospate deposits. 
The vast majority of the population favored a United Nations supervised referendum 
on independence. In November of the same year, thousands of Mo.roccan troops along with a 
token Mauitanian force invaded and occupied the Western Sahara. King Hassan of 
Morocco, one of the last absolute monarchs in the world, argued that the Saharan 
territory was part of a Greater Morocco before the era of European colonialism. 
Mauritania similarly laid claim to some of the Western Sahara on the same grounds. 
One of the founding principles of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was the 
respect and acceptance of inherited colonial borders otherwise the whole continent 
would be engulfed in a state of constant warfare. 
Upon invasion, half of the 80,000 people in the territory fled to Algeria and the 
Polisario, the Saharan peoples nationalist organization formed in 1973, launched 
a guerilla war to dislodge the occupying forces. By 1978, Mauritania after a change 
of leadership relinquished all. claims and entered negotiations to withdraw. She 
·• dinally did so in 1979 . Morocco then laid claim to the entire territory . But the 
Polisario with the financial backing and military assistance of Algeria and Libya 
succeeded in limiting Morocco's effective control to the nothern third of the country. 
Although Morocco ' s internal economic conditions deteriotated, King Hassan, a longtime ally 
of the U.S. requested significant arms transfers from the U.S.--helicopters, tan1cs, 
armored personnel carriers, and both fighter and transport AiLcrafts. President Carter 
and the Congress agreed to the sales although the terms of a 1960 bl.lateral agreement 
prohibited U.S. weapons from being used offensively outside Morocco's border . Films 
and photographs taken by the Polisario and Western journatlists clearly showed .destroyed 
and/or captured U.S.-supplied weapons. The Moroccan government has even stated its 
intention to continue using U.S . weapons in the Western Saharan since it is considered 
part of Morocco. 
Instead of halting arm deliveries until the Moroccan government complies with the 
1960 military agreement and agree to a negotiated settlement, the arm sales have 
gone ahead and the new administration is on record in staunch support of the teetering 
Hassan regime. These actions of the U.S. government negate the Saharans people 
right to self-determination. The United Nations, the OAU, and even Spain has 
urged an end to hostilities and a referendum. After the June 1981 OAU conference 
in Kenya, Hassan tentatively agreed to a ceasefire and a referendum but difficulties 
arose as to who would be eligible to vote. According to the Polisario, Hassan wants 
to exclude the refugees in Algeria. 1t is imclear ··What .. the .actual population ·is 
since a census has never been taken but by most independent observations the vast 
majority of the population, 60-80% is outside the country in Algerian refugee camps. 
However, the initiative. may be set back since October 13th, the Polisario jolted 
King Hassan with the daring capture of Guelta Zemmour garrison. Destroyed in the 
fighting were five aircrafts, two · of which were American supplied. In response a 
delegation of high-level State and Pentagon officials visited Morocco in early 
November and entertained pleas for more U.S. backing and weapon transfers. Francis 
West, Assistant Secretary of Defense and leader of the delegation, was quoted as 
pledging stepped up military training. 
TransAfrica condemns the actions of both the Carter and Reagan Administrations in 
support of naked territorial expansionism. The Western Sahara is but another 
in a long list of cases where the U.S. abandons its democratic traditions in pursuit 
of economic greed, convenient military alliances, and reckless reaction to perceived 
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Western Sahara/Morocco (cont.) 
communist plots. By actions such as these the U.S. only confirms its imperialistic, 
reactionary image and poisons relationships with the nationalistic leadership that 
usually emerges victorious. 
Horn of Africa 
President Siad Barre of Somalia decided to commit regular troops to a long festering 
secessionist dispute in the Ogaden regions of neighboring Ethophia in 1978. The 
Somali people spill over borders with Kenya and Ethophia and many have dreamed of 
being reunited into one state. In Ethophia, the Somali nomads suffering under the 
brutal oppression of the central government have revolted sporadically, demanding 
independence or at the very least autonomy. The Somalia government over the years 
has covertly provided money, weapons, and training to the Ogaden insurgents. 
The U.S. seeing this an an opportunity to further destablize the Marxist dominated 
Ethophia, supported Siad Barre's actions. Ethophia at the , time .. was fighting three 
wars of secession--the old .empire was in decline. Somalia committed a gross mis-
calcuation. She did not expect the Cuban/Soviet troops in the country to lead the 
counteroffensive. The better trained and equipped Cuban/Soviet contingent drove 
the Somali army back to its original border. In the process 1.5 million people 
streamed out of the Ogaden, C.reating :the world's largest refugee problem. 
In 1980 Congress voted to make all arm transfers to Somalia conditional on the absence 
of regular troops in the Ogaden. The debate then became clouded in geostrategic 
rhetoric. Administration officials argued that the U.S. had to secure Berbera, a 
northern Somal~ seaport, and· stand by Somalia against the onslaught of connnunist 
troops because of the country's proximity to the Persian Gulf and the sea lanes 
that carry the bulk of oil to the West. 
Fortunately, fighting has abated in the area and most of the attention is focused 
o~ keeping the refugee population alive. In TransAfrica's view, Somalia was 
guilty of violating the cardinal OAU's principle--respect for the artificial 
boundaries inherited from the colonial powers. As a result of grandiose dreams 
and superpower .. meddling, millions have been reduced to pitiful destitution and 
the economic future of the whole region dimmed. By pursuing an interventionistic 
policy the U. S. again only succeeded in making a bad situation worse . Ethophia 
is ever more dependent on the Soviet Union, , the -Ogadeil.is an oC<?upied province, ... and 
Somalia is so strapped it will have to rely on international relief for years to 
come. 
Muamar Khaddafi's Libya has played a mixed role in international affairs, supporting 
legitimate liberation movements while at the same time allegedly sponsoring assassinatior 
teams, encouraging hijackings, harassing exiles, defending Idi Amin, and fanning sectaric 
unrest .in neighbo~ing countries. The image projected in the press is one of unpredict~ 
ability .and megalomania which seems to bear some truth. 
TransAfrica complements Khaddafi on his substantial assistance to genuine liberation 
movements in Palestine, South Africa, Namibia, the Western Sahara, and El Salvador 
as well as the help given the newly formed governments in Nicaragua, Grenada, and 
Mozambique. Ho.wever, other actions of President Khaddafi have been untenable and 
at times regrettable. Therefore, TransAfrica prefers rteither to categ0rically praise 
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Libya (cont.) 
or condemn. Each Libyan action should be judged on its own merit. Nevertheless,. 
TransAfrica fears that the erratic record of Khaddafi will be used by the administration 
as the grounds on which to attempt a covert overthrow. TransAfrica believes that 
covert means are not needed . 
Cuba/Grenada 
Since January 1981 the keynote of the emerging Reagan Caribbean policy has been the 
isolation and sabotage of these two islands. Cuba has been castigated for being an 
arms conduit for the Salvadorean guerillas and Grenada has been suspected of becoming 
a Soviet/Cuban staging base. The later charge is completely without factual base. 
In an effort to fan internal unrest, the administration plans to construct a $10 million 
radio station (Radio Jose Marti) which will beam 24 hours of "sharp edged" programming 
at Cuba. Voice of America already has a daily five hour program that is very credible 
and reaches the whole island. Cuba will probably respond by jamming the airwaves, 
causing broadcasting disruptions in the southern Florida area. During the Summer 
Cuban authorities blamed the mysterious outbreak of dengue fev.er that afflicted 220,000 
and killed 113 on the U.S. Infected pellets and viral deposits on leaves were allegedly 
found suggesting biological warfare. 
In the case of Grenada, the chill and sabotage is even more blatant. In the spring, 
the U.S. lobbied aggressively to.dissuade -1>urapean countries .from contributing money 
for the construction of a 9,000 ft. airport intended to bolster the islands tourist 
industry. Shortly thereafter, the Caribbean Development Bank was asked to exclude 
Grenada from a $4 million grant in clear violation of the bank's charter. On the 
diplomatic front, letters of the Prime Minister and phone inquires of the Grenada 
mission go unanswered. The cred~ntials of Ambassador-designate Dessima Williams 
have not been accepted. 
TransAfrica sees no fruitful end to the Cold War atmosphere. It only serves to 
heighten the insecurities of the two island states and increase their dependence 
on the Eastern bloc. These countries should be seen as pursuing alternative 
development strategies and thereby deserving of noninterference. Albeit the 
U.S. may be at odds with the political orientation of the two regimes, much can 
be gained by following a policy of tolerance. By having low-level diplomatic 
relations with Cuba antic;hijac)<ing measures .-can. be better enforced, the flow . 
of drugs controlled, and the exchange of navigational and meteorological information 
occur. In the case of Grenada, the present behavior of the U.S. is mean-spirited 
and counterproductive. Full and equal d~plomatic relations should be accorded the 
tiny island of Grenada. 
In regards to Cuban arms transshipment, the U.S. should not be hypocritical. 
The U.S . has supplied weapons for years to the repressive , right-wing regimes 
in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua before the fall of Somoza. The U.S. 
again seems to· be attributing the civil war in El Salvador to Soviet instigation 
when it is the objective conditions of widespread poverty, .exploitive social 
institutions, and police violence that gave rise to the conflict. Instead of 
continuing to back a military controlled government that brutalizes its own 
population, the U.S. should be courting the opposition who in all probability 
will emerge victorious. A_moraroriuro qn all arms -transfers, ·a ceasefire, and 
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Cuba/Grenada (cont.) 
immediate elections should be advocated instead of trying to bolster a regime 
that daily loses more and more legitiamcy. The present Reagan policies threaten 
only to engulf the country in another debacle. Guerilla wars are wars not so much 
of guns and bullets but wars of symbols and hearts. The leftist guerillas in 
El Salvador at ·the moment-·seem to .,be ,.cleiricly -Winnigg . the he.,;-ts .of the .masses. 
In rega,::ds to _.th<; large deployment of Cuban , troops .overseas ; ,,.TransAfrica generally 
disaproves. In the case of Angola, their presence is interconnected With the 
Namibian peace settlement. Militarism in the Third World should be actively dis-
couraged. Foreign troop deployment whether Russian, French, Cuban, Libyan, or American 
should be avoided, they tend to stimulate arm build-ups and polarize relations in 
the said region. The use or reliance on military means represents a profound failure 
in the economic and political systems. 
A Marxist-oriented faction, the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 
came to power in 1975 with the backing of Cuban troops after the conflict had been 
internationalized by the CIA and South Africa. The MPLA despite its rhetoric has 
proven to be very pragmatiC. It has refrained from nationalizing Western economic 
interests and gone to the ironic extreme of posting guards to protect Gulf Oil 
Cabinda refinery. Moreover, the Angolan leadership has welcomed Western investments 
and technical assistance and refused membership in COMECON, the Eastern bloc comrii.on 
market. Most countries in the world recognize the MPLA as the legitimate government 
with the exception of the U.S. among Western powers. 
The U.S. government continues to rail against the presence of 18-20,000 Cuban troops 
and seeks to make their withdrawal a possible condition for a peace sett_lement in Namibia . 
The MPLA government claims with good cause that the Cubans are a deterrent force. During 
the 1975 civil war, South Africa invaded Angola twice on the side of pro-Western Jonas 
Savimbi's faction, UNITA, and marched within 60 miles of Luanda, the capital. In the 
north at the same time the CIA poured $30 million in Roberto Holden's group, the FLNA, 
causing alarm in the U.~. Congress and prompting the pasSage of the Clark amendment. 
Si nce 1978, the South Africans have conducted over 2,000 sorties, aerial bombings and 
incursions into the southern provinces supposed)..y in pursuit of SWAPO, the Namibian 
nationalistic group waging a guerilla war against South Africa. As a result of the 
repeated attacks in southern Angola much of the infrastructure, commercial factories, 
schools, and hospitals have been destroyed. At Cassinga, . in April 1980, some 800 innocent 
women and children were massacred. Under the r.uBric of "hot pursuit" South Africa has 
been waging a campaign of destablization against Angola in the hope that the common· 
people will grow tired of offering refuge to SWAPO. In the southestern part of the 
country, Savamibi's UNITA with substantial backing from South Africa ties down a large 
proportion of the MPLA army. Although Savambi cannot defeat the MPLA conclusively 
he succeeds in disrupting the e conomy and draining vital resources by keeping the 
central government on a war footing. 
TransAfrica believes that steps should be taken to woo Angola away from, Cuban/Soviet 
dependency. Greater U.S. economic involvemnt , technical assistance, and normalization 
of diplomatic relations would help. The immediate task remains to obtain a speedy 
settlement in neighboring Namibia which would allow the Cubans to withdraw and some 
form of reconciliation to occur between the central government and Jonas Savimbi. 
African Refugees 
In 1980 Africa was estimated to harbor 5 million or half of the world's refugees. 
Drought, civil strife, and war have causes this massive dislocation of people. 
Somalia and the Sudan host the two largest refugee populations, 1.5 million 
and .5 million respectively. Both countries rank among the least developed 
by World Bank standards with GNP per capita incomes of less than $380 per year. 
'International relief. agencies and .. the ~bast ·governments strtiggle· valiantly to meet 
the minimal needs of these displaced people. 
At the April 8-9th, 1981 United Nations pledging conference, the U.S. contributed $285 
million, the largest single amount. Nevertheless, the total contributions, $559.8 millior 
were considerably less than the amount African host countries sought which was $1.2 billic 
TransAfrica assails the U.S.-African refugee policy on three counts. First, the 
U.S. spends disproportionately less per African refugee than for refugees of other 
nationalities or racial origin. For example, in 1979 an average of $2000 was spent 
per Soviet Jew compared to $26.68 per African. As the number of African refugees 
swelled the dollar allocation fell. In 1981, it is estimated $15.42 will be spent 
per African refugee in contrast to $43.30 on the typical Kamphucean in Thailand . 
Secondly, there exist a clear bias against refugess of African descent in the U.S. 
admission policies. Whereas the ceiling for Soviet and Eastern European entrants is 
33,000, it is only 3,000 of Africans and Haitians are categorically denied refugee 
status. The administration argues that due to vastly different stages of socio-
economic development Africans prefer not to relocate in the U.S .. However, several 
thousand Ethophians most of whom came to the U.S. for higher education are presently 
deportable since the political situation in their homeland is considered stablized. 
The 1974 revolution brought Marxist Mengistu Haile Ariam to power and .in the neform perioc 
that .followed .property.;.was·, co,ifhcated and people detained . Resident Ethopians fearing 
for their safety upon return overstayed their visas. At the present Ethophia is 
still beset by problems--religious strife, tWo secessionist movements, drought, and 
a badly deteriorated economy, and continued human rights·viOlations~~yet the administratic 
thinks otherwise. Interestingly, Russian defectOrs or Cubans are not forced to 
return to their homelands against their wishes. Thirdly, the U.S. does not pay much 
attention to the longterm resettlement needs of African refugee population. The 
looming danger is that the large indigent refugee communities will incite host country 
antagonism and so overburden the economic resources of that country that it to will 
become unstable. School~, clinics, farm implements, seed, livestock, and construction 
materials are needed in several countries where refugee repatriation is unlikely in 
the near future. 
Haitian Boat People 
Since 1972, 50-70, 000 Haitians have braved 700 miles of open sea usually .Jn flimsy 
vessels, seeking freedom and a better economic future in south Florida. During 
1980 some 20,000 came in the Wqke of the Cuban boatlift. The U.S. government argues 
that Haitians are economic migrants and therefore ineligible for political asylum 
and refugee status. However, a July 1980 court case found strong evidence supporting 
patterns of persecution-- ·arbitrary arrests, beatings, torture, and extortion experienced 
by Haitians returned to their homeland ... .. '. These . eXcesses violated the U .N. Protocol 
on Refugees and the U.S. Refugee Act. The court recommended that the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service cease it practice of gross due process violations. D~sPite 
the court decision, the Reagan administration has moved ahead to continue the dis-
criminatory treatment by begining interdiction of Haitian vessels on the high seas 
and introducing legislation to limit the number of appeals to one and streamline the 
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whole asylum and exclusion proceedings. 
TransAfrica condemns the inequitable and harsh treatment of Haitians and plans 
to counter the administration's legislative proposals. In our view the government 
has for too long used asylum as a propaganda tool to embarrass communist dominated 
countries subordinating the merits of each case . Over 94% of the refugee slots 
have bee~ allocated to Indochinese and Eastern Europeans. Whereas there is a 
civil war in El Salvador that has generated 180,000 refugees and Haiti ranks as 
one of the poorest and most repressive regimes in the Western Hemisphere, only 2,000 
refugee slots have been set aside for the Caribbean and Latin America ·. Clearly, 
ideology and race are obscuring true humanitarian need. TransAfrica advocates the 
establishment of an independent asylum review board that would consider appeals 
and issue guidelines based on their expert assessment Of conditions in the country. 
Secondly, the U.S . should alternatively pressure for reform and help to cultivate 
an effective opposition to the rapacious Duvalier regime. 
Economic Development 
Basic unfilled needs, exploitative arrangements, and despair stand as the main 
obstacles to self-sustaining· ·growth and generalized prosperity. The challenge is 
formidable and Complex. Development, it should be stressed, means more than wealth 
accumulation. It is also a transformation of social relations, values, outlooks, 
and the ecosystem. For this reason broad segments of the population need to patticipate 
so as to control the thrust, the pace, and widely disburse the benefits. Unfortunately, 
"cults of experts 11 and externally controlled development processes seem to be 
creating distorted, unbalanced societies. 
Today Africa ranks low on quality of life indicators such as life expectancy, 
infant mortality rates, . literacy, availability of safe water, incidence of 
diseases, and access to health care, making the continent the poorest region 
in the world. Moreover, the future looks grim. Declining agricultural output 
matched with rising population growth rates, increasing desertification, and acute 
vulnerability to external shocks all spell ill. 
The Caribbean with the exception of Haiti ranks higher than Africa on most 
indicat&rs of economic well-being, but the area has a special problem---
microeconomies. Fourteen of the . nineteen political entities in the lower 
half of the island chain each have less than 180 square miles in area or smaller 
than most mid-size American cities. Because of the small size and insularity-
economic opportunities are subscribed. For ... the ..moSt part the islands are dependent 
on the export of agricultural commodities such as bananas and sugar and the inflow 
of tourists who enjoy the scenic beauty. In order to break the cycle of poverty 
and external dependency .greater regional cooperation and economic integration 
seem imperative. Regretfully, no serious Pan-Caribbean consciousness has emerged 
and the states remain divided along language lines and various spheres of outside 
influence. 
TransAfrica views economic development as the major problem confronting the Third 
World and especially Africa and the Caribbean. The colonial legacy, the ongoing 
process of poTitica,1 .consolidation, and ·ext::ernal shocks also contribute to the 
general weakness of the two regions. What seems to be needed is strong indigenous 
leadership coupled with larger levels of foreign assistance, technology transfers, 
and structural reform of the trade and monetary system. The West as the main beneficiari~ 
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of the status quo, of course, are reluctant to entertain such ideas. The task 
remains for the Third World and especially Africa and the Caribbean to force 
concessions. SinCe rational persuasion is effete, the real challenge lies 
in greater regional cooperation that will strengthen the bargaining position of 
the less developed countries by being able to present a united front. In a 
world of increasing interdependency it will be in the interest of the West to 
respond positively. To date the Eastern bloc has been quite limited in the 
amount and type of aid it can provided. Being poorer than the West, the East has 
tended to only provide weapons and technical assistance. Aid from the West, 
on the other hand, has usually been used to gain influnce with the leadership, 
generate exports for the donor country, and force the recipient to adhere 
to the economic . philosophy of the donor. Thus, great caution has to be exercised 
by Third World countries. 
TransAfrica continues to advocate a serious commitment of energies and resources 
to alleviating the two region's problems. A world of glaring inequities threatens 
all, it increases the chances for supply disruptions, bankruptcies, war, and 
untold human suffering. Instead of emphasizing military security, the U.S. 
should focus on the root causes of instability . The present administration 
seeks to increase military sales by 200% while economic assistance remains 
constant at approximately .27% of the GNP, making the U.S. fifteenth in a 
list of seventeen donors and well below the 1% of GNP all Western countries 
are supposed to give. This emphasis only reinforces the shamefull statistic--
$500 billion spent annually on weapons and half the world's scientists are 
in engaged in the researc.h and development of arms. 
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Nuclear Weapons Capability 
TransAfrica generally takes a dim view of the spread of nuclear energy because 
of the safety hazards posed by the possibility of reactor accidents and the dis-
posal of radioactive waste. More frightening, of course, is the possibility of 
nuclear materials being diverted for a clandestine weapons program. Although the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty with its extensive safeguards and international 
monitoring offers some comfort, quite a number of countries with suspect motives 
have not signed, among them Israel, Iraq, Brazil, India, Libya, Taiwan, and South Africa. 
Fortunately, the Caribbean is a nuclear free zone. However, on the African continent 
the situation is different. Libya has openly expressed interest in obtaining nuclear 
bombs but to date has been unsuccessful. At the other end of the continent, much 
circumstantial evidence exist suggesting that South Africa possesses a small arsenal 
of nuclear weapons . In August 1977, Western intelligence agencies discovered a nuclear 
test site in the Kalahari desert and in September 1979 two intense light bursts with 
the telltale signature of an above ground nuclear explosion occurred in a remote portion 
9f. the South Atlantic off the coast of South Africa. U.S. authorities publicly attributed 
the . flashes to very large falling meteorites . Other private, knowledgeable persons 
believed the intensity ,md ithe duration .. of the bursts greatly. reduced the probability 
of natural phenomena. · 
Other research, nontheless, shows that South Africa independently developed short range 
ground to ground and air to ground missles between 1968 and 1971. In 1964, Allis-Chalmers 
a U.S. corporation, sold the South · Africans an experimental research nuclear reactor 
called Safari-I and up until President Carter assumed power, the U.S. exported enriched 
uranium, plutonium, and thorium--all combustible nuclear materials--in small quantities 
for use in their research reactors. It has been suggested that either or both the 
diversion of these materials and the processing of uranium in' -its own reactors en.ables 
South Africa to garner sufficient weapons grade material. As a mid.dle level power 
South Africa has delivery capability--bombers, missiles, and artillery. 
Since 1978 there have been no U.S. enriched uranium pursuant to South Africa's failure 
to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Many observers think that South Africa 
does not want to divulge its technical secrets to the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the Treaty monitors. With the electi,on of. Reagan and the warming of relations 
between the two countries, rumors ~b~und a.bout a deal in the making. The Reagan people 
want South Africa to agree to some· 
nuclear ties. The administration, h6Wever, sustained a defeat when the South .Africans 
obtained some enriched uranium supposedly from China and France, bound by a contractual 
agreement, began processing the fuel into rods for the large Koeberg reactor plant 
near the Cape of Good Hope that is scheduled to begin operations in 1985. From this 
2,000 megawatt station, South Africa will be able to produce plutonium to make 100 
or so nuclear bombs a year if she chooses to do so. With the the French deal, South 
Africa is now in a very secure position. 
TransAfrica condemns the .record of nuclear powers especially West Germany, France 
Swit zerland, and the United States in transferring nuclear technology, trafficking, 
and exporting uranium without recipient adherence to strict safeguards. Economic 
greed and maneuvers to win influence may return to haunt us all. Nuclear capability 
in the southern hemisphere is not so much a necessity as a prestige item. Great 
restraint and discretion need to be exercised by all parties. 
11 
Soviet Union 
TransAfrica views the Soviet Union as an imperialistic power just like the United 
States. Both superpowers seek to dominate and expand their orbit of influence over 
other countires to their . advantage. Both seek to embarrass and contain the other. 
However, we do not believe the Soviets have a grand plot to capture the .world or 
to strangle the West by seizing countries of either economic or geographic importance 
to the West. Russia is simply an empire state beset with a slew of problems: growing 
consumer demands; stagnant agriculture; a sputtering economy; unrest in Poland and the 
Asiatic republics; rapid population growth among non-Russian people who already are 
a majority of the Soviet Union's population; an ailing leadership; and a number of 
setbacks in Somalia, Sudan, Egypt, and Vietnam that not have been offset by equal 
strategic gains. As a result of these,internal problems and a . jebilitating arms 
build up", the Soviet Union simp:ly se.i:i.es opportunities as they appear in the Third 
World to increase its leverage. 
The most typical scenario is one of open insurrection or civil war where one faction 
is fighting to oust a .colonial master or an authoritarian, degenerate pro-western 
regime. The insurgent group usually has no choice but to accept Soviets arms and 
training since the ruling regime is backed the U.S. other another Western power. 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities all peaceful means of reform failed and in the 
process political consenus shatters - and opinions became polarized.with the .active 
opposition becoming increasingly leftist-oriented. If the insurgent, leftist faction 
succeeds the U.S. automatically 1.responds in an adverse manner facing the nascent 
regime further into the Soviet embrace. 
TransAfrica would argue that underwriting the arms bill for an insurgent group does 
not necessarily mean control of the group. Each ·.nationalistic:. leadership should be 
assessed independently. Recent history . has shown that nationalism is a stronger 
force than ideology and economic necessity the ultimate arbiter. Third World leaders 
have demOnstrated their independence .and should continue to do so. We see the main 
challenges confronting Africa and the Caribbean to be political/social reorganization 
and economic developmen.t, not ideological purity. 
Socialism as a strategy for development has proven to be no pancea. Neither has 
capitalism, What Western observers and policymakers sorely need is empathy and a 
broader world view. The yZorld can not be schematized into 11us 11 and 11 them11 , it 
is an interdependent world where 3/4 of the planet's population is in the throes 
of disconcerting and rapid change. The onging modernization is both far-reaching 
and stressful. Accordingly, the stance of the West and the East ideally should 
be avuncular and tolerant. Most of the burden, of course, rest with African 
and Caribbean peoples themselves to maneuver for a wider berth and to control 
more of their destinies. · 
